Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence by Kadane, Joseph B. & Koehler, Jonathan J.
CSAFE Publications Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic Evidence 
Fall 2018 
Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence 
Joseph B. Kadane 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Jonathan J. Koehler 
Northwestern University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/csafe_pubs 
 Part of the Forensic Science and Technology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kadane, Joseph B. and Koehler, Jonathan J., "Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence" 
(2018). CSAFE Publications. 12. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/csafe_pubs/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Statistics and Applications in Forensic 
Evidence at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in CSAFE Publications by an 
authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact 
digirep@iastate.edu. 
Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence 
Abstract 
Everyone knows that fingerprint evidence can be extremely incriminating. What is less clear is whether the 
way that a fingerprint examiner describes that evidence influences the weight lay jurors assign to it. This 
essay describes an experiment testing how lay people respond to different presentations of fingerprint 
evidence in a hypothetical criminal case. We find that people attach more weight to the evidence when 
the fingerprint examiner indicates that he believes or knows that the defendant is the source of the print. 
When the examiner offers a weaker, but more scientifically justifiable, conclusion, the evidence is given 
less weight. However, people do not value the evidence any more or less when the examiner uses very 
strong language to indicate that the defendant is the source of the print versus weaker source 
identification language. We also find that cross-examination designed to highlight weaknesses in the 
fingerprint evidence has no impact regardless of which type of conclusion the examiner offers. We 
conclude by considering implications for ongoing reform efforts. 
Disciplines 
Forensic Science and Technology 
Comments 
This article is published as Kadane, Joseph B., and Jonathan J. Koehler. "Certainty & Uncertainty in 
Reporting Fingerprint Evidence." Daedalus 147, no. 4 (2018): 119-134. 
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/csafe_pubs/12 
119
© 2018 by Joseph B. Kadane & Jonathan J. Koehler 
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00524
Certainty & Uncertainty in Reporting  
Fingerprint Evidence
Joseph B. Kadane & Jonathan J. Koehler
Abstract: Everyone knows that fingerprint evidence can be extremely incriminating. What is less clear is 
whether the way that a fingerprint examiner describes that evidence influences the weight lay jurors assign 
to it. This essay describes an experiment testing how lay people respond to different presentations of fin-
gerprint evidence in a hypothetical criminal case. We find that people attach more weight to the evidence 
when the fingerprint examiner indicates that he believes or knows that the defendant is the source of the 
print. When the examiner offers a weaker, but more scientifically justifiable, conclusion, the evidence is 
given less weight. However, people do not value the evidence any more or less when the examiner uses very 
strong language to indicate that the defendant is the source of the print versus weaker source identifica-
tion language. We also find that cross-examination designed to highlight weaknesses in the fingerprint ev-
idence has no impact regardless of which type of conclusion the examiner offers. We conclude by consid-
ering implications for ongoing reform efforts.
The study of fingerprints began in a serious way 
with Francis Galton’s book Finger Prints in 1892.1 For 
more than a century, fingerprint results were treated 
by the forensic science community (and the courts) 
as infallible, or nearly so. In 1985, an authoritative fbi 
manual stated, “of all the methods of identification, 
fingerprinting alone has proved to be both infallible 
and feasible.”2 In a 2003 segment on the television 
news program 60 Minutes, the head of the fbi’s fin-
gerprint unit said that the probability of error in fin-
gerprint analysis is 0 percent, and that all analysts 
are and should be 100 percent certain of the identi-
fications that they offer in court.3 Such hyperbole 
is unscientific and unsustainable. As it turned out, 
just a few months after this program aired, the fbi 
was forced to admit that its top fingerprint examin-
ers matched a print to the wrong person in the in-
vestigation of the 2004 Madrid train bombings, one 
of the highest profile fingerprint cases in history.4
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When the National Academy of Sciences 
(nas) completed its comprehensive re-
view of many of the non-dna forensic sci-
ences (including fingerprint evidence) in 
2009, the results were shocking.5 The nas 
found that many of the most basic foren-
sic science claims had not been validated 
by empirical research. In response, federal 
agencies and forensic science profession-
al organizations began working in ear-
nest to, among other things, modify the 
ways in which forensic scientists present 
evidence in court. Simple and obvious re-
forms such as eliminating references to 
“100 percent certain” identifications and 
“0 percent risk of error” have already tak-
en hold. However, forensic science reform-
ers have been largely flying blind on the 
question of which specific words should 
replace the exaggerated conclusions that 
forensic scientists often provide in their 
courtroom testimony.6 
Fingerprint evidence has been admit-
ted in U.S. courts as proof of identity in 
criminal cases for more than one hundred 
years. Evidence that an unknown print re-
covered from a crime scene (a so-called la-
tent print) matches a known print from a 
suspect or other individual is rarely chal-
lenged in court and is widely regarded by 
the public as conclusive proof that the 
person whose fingerprint matched is the 
source of the latent print in question. This 
is the case even when the match is to la-
tent prints that are partial, smudged, or 
otherwise of low quality, although all of 
these features increase both the difficulty 
of declaring a definite match and the like-
lihood of error.7 
Fingerprint evidence has long been a 
powerful tool for criminal investigators 
and prosecutors. A latent print found on, 
say, a gun recovered from a shooting scene 
not only helps identify a person of interest 
for police in the early stages of an investi-
gation, but it also may be the single most 
powerful proof of a defendant’s guilt of-
fered at trial. This essay looks at the use of 
fingerprint evidence as a tool to persuade 
judges and jurors at trial or, more com-
monly, to persuade a criminal defendant 
to accept a plea bargain rather than risk a 
seemingly certain guilty verdict. This es-
say, however, concerns itself only with the 
presentation of fingerprint evidence at tri-
als, asking how the way a fingerprint exam-
iner testifies about his or her results affects 
the weight that factfinders are likely to as-
sign to the evidence. 
In the typical case involving fingerprint 
evidence, a trained examiner compares one 
or more latent prints with various known 
or exemplar prints using a high-powered 
microscope. This process is often preced-
ed by an automated search through a local, 
state, or national database. The national da-
tabase includes fingerprints from approxi-
mately 120 million people. The computer 
search narrows the list of candidate prints 
and orders them so that the most likely 
matches appear at the top of the list. The 
examiner then proceeds to make pairwise 
comparisons between the latent and candi-
date prints. The end result of the pairwise 
comparison process (known as ace-v)8 
is usually one of four conclusions: iden-
tification (the prints comes from the same 
source), exclusion (the prints come from dif-
ferent sources), inconclusive, or unsuitable for 
comparison.
Although the ace-v process is subjec-
tive, fingerprint examiners have histori-
cally claimed that their identifications are 
100 percent certain, and that there is virtu-
ally no chance that an error has occurred.9 
The precise meaning of the word “identi-
fication” may, however, vary depending on 
idiosyncratic definitions and usage by var-
ious parties.10 While the Humpty-Dumpty 
dictum may appeal to some testifying fo-
rensic scientists (“when I use a word . . . 
it means just what I choose it to mean”), 
it is unjustified in courts of law where the 
interpretation of an unfamiliar or techni-
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cal phrase may be the difference between 
freedom and incarceration for a criminal 
defendant.11
There is some basis in the broader foren-
sic science literature for suggesting that 
the weight that jurors assign to fingerprint 
evidence will depend, in part, on the way 
that fingerprint examiners describe their 
conclusions. Psychological studies show 
that the way dna results are framed af-
fects the value that people accord to re-
ported matches.12 Focusing on microscop-
ic hair results, psychologists Dawn Mc-
Quiston-Surrett and Michael Saks found 
that the way hair-evidence matches are de-
scribed affects mock jurors’ assessments 
of the probability that the person whose 
hair is said to match is the source of the un-
known hair.13 The mock jurors in their ex-
periments assigned higher probabilities of 
source identification when hair evidence 
was described as either a “match” or “sim-
ilar in all microscopic characteristics,” and 
lower probabilities when the forensic ex-
pert estimated the number of other people 
in the city who would also match.
However, these studies did not find that 
mock jurors’ judgments varied as a func-
tion of whether forensic experts went 
further and volunteered their own opin-
ion that the person whose hair was said to 
match was the source of the hair. Similar-
ly, an experiment conducted by legal schol-
ar Brandon Garrett and psychologist and 
lawyer Gregory Mitchell in the context of 
short written cases that involved finger-
print evidence found that “bolstering a 
match with even extravagant claims about 
the certainty of the match and dismissals 
of the likelihood that someone else sup-
plied the prints did not increase the weight 
given to the match.”14 Participants in 
their study were no more impressed with 
the fingerprint evidence when the finger-
print examiner said that it was “a prac-
tical impossibility” that someone other 
than the defendant was the source of the 
latent print or the examiner simply said 
that the defendant “matched” the latent 
print.15 These investigators concluded that 
it really did not matter how an examiner 
framed a match conclusion because fact-
finders give “considerable weight” to fin-
gerprint match evidence in all forms.16
It appears, then, that the way forensic 
science testimony is presented by experts 
will matter in some circumstances but not 
others. When a defendant is a member of 
a group of those who might be the source 
of an incriminating piece of evidence, tes-
timony that fails to point out the existence 
of others in the set who might be the source 
is viewed as stronger than testimony that 
expressly notes that the defendant is one of 
a group of people who might be the source. 
But when a forensic scientist indicates in 
some fashion his or her belief that the de-
fendant is the source of an incriminating 
piece of evidence, it is not clear that such 
add-on comments have an extra impact on 
factfinders.
Thanks in large part to the 2009 Nation-
al Academy of Sciences report on the state 
of the non-dna forensic sciences, efforts 
are underway to standardize and reform 
many forensic science practices, including 
the way results and conclusions are report-
ed in court.17 These reform efforts have 
thus far proceeded with little or no guid-
ance from empirical studies. Consequent-
ly, there is a risk that proposed changes in 
the conclusory language used by forensic 
scientists will have no impact–or perhaps 
even an unintended impact–on police, le-
gal decision makers, and others who rely 
on forensic evidence. Our essay reports on 
an experiment that addresses this concern. 
The experiment examines how people in-
terpret and use different verbal formula-
tions of conclusions reached by fingerprint 
examiners.
Six hundred jury-eligible citizens (U.S. 
citizens, at least eighteen years old, with 






no felony convictions) were paid to an-
swer an online questionnaire about a hy-
pothetical legal case that included fin-
gerprint evidence. Our mock jurors (“ju-
rors”) covered a broad and representative 
cross-section of the jury-eligible popula-
tion in terms of education level (19.5 per-
cent high school diploma or less, 14.5 per-
cent graduate degrees), ethnicity (7.7 per-
cent African American), and gender (58 
percent women).
Jurors were presented with the follow-
ing scenario:
In a recent legal case, Mr. Richard Johnson 
was charged with robbing a convenience 
store. Although the perpetrator of the crime 
wore a hood that covered his face, Mr. John-
son became a suspect when the store own-
er told police that he thought the perpetra-
tor sounded very much like one of his fre-
quent customers, Mr. Richard Johnson. The 
store owner also told police that the perpe-
trator reached into the opened cash regis-
ter with his bare hand and lifted one of the 
trays. When a police fingerprint examiner 
examined the cash register and its inside 
trays for fingerprints, he found 19 prints 
that were suitable for comparison purpos-
es. The fingerprint examiner eliminated 
Mr. Johnson as a potential source of 18 of 
those prints. However, the fingerprint ex-
aminer was not able to eliminate Mr. John-
son as a possible contributor of one of the 
prints that was found on the cash register 
tray. At Mr. Johnson’s robbery trial, the fin-
gerprint examiner was called to testify for 
the prosecution. After the fingerprint exam-
iner discussed his credentials, experience, 
and methods, the following exchange took 
place between the prosecutor (P) and the fin-
gerprint examiner (FE):
P: Now you said that you recovered 19 finger-
prints from the cash register, is that correct? 
FE: Yes, there were 19 prints that had enough 
detail that I could compare them to known 
exemplars.
P: What is a known exemplar?
FE: It’s a reference print–a print whose 
source is known. We compare the prints 
that we recover on objects from a crime 
scene with various known exemplars. So in 
this case, I had known exemplars from Mr. 
Johnson, the employees of the convenience 
store, and some other people. And I com-
pared the prints that were on the cash reg-
ister and cash register components with the 
known exemplars.
P: OK, and what were your findings with re-
spect to the prints that were on the cash reg-
ister and the known exemplar print provid-
ed by the defendant in this case, Mr. Rich-
ard Johnson?
FE: Well, first, I was able to exclude Mr. John-
son as a possible contributor of 18 of the 19 
latent prints that were on the cash register 
or its various components. In other words, 
none of those 18 prints were made by Mr. 
Johnson. However, I was not able to exclude 
Mr. Johnson as a possible contributor of the 
19th print. This 19th print was taken from the 
cash register tray.
P: And so your bottom line conclusion is 
what?
At this point, jurors received one of 
six different single-sentence conclusions 
from the fingerprint examiner. In all cases, 
the conclusion that jurors saw was preced-
ed by the words “My bottom line conclu-
sion is that . . .” The six conclusory state-
ments were as follows:
1. “. . . I cannot exclude the defendant, Mr. 
Johnson, as a possible contributor of that 
print.”
2. “. . . the likelihood of observing this 
amount of correspondence when two im-
pressions are made by different sources is 
considered extremely low.”
3. “. . . in my opinion, the defendant, Mr. 
Johnson, is the source of that print.”
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4. “. . . in my opinion, the defendant, Mr. 
Johnson, is the source of that print to a rea-
sonable degree of scientific certainty.”
5. “. . . I was able to effect an individualiza-
tion on that latent print to the defendant, 
Mr. Johnson.”
6. “. . . I was able to effect an individualiza-
tion on that latent print to the defendant, Mr. 
Johnson, to the exclusion of all other possi-
ble sources in the world.”
The first conclusion (“I cannot exclude”) 
is widely recognized as a scientifically ac-
curate and defensible (albeit conservative) 
way to describe the results of a match be-
tween a known and unknown print.18 If 
a known print from a suspect appears to 
share a common set of characteristics with 
an unknown print recovered from a crime 
scene and there are no other explainable in-
consistencies, it follows as a matter of log-
ic that an examiner would be justified in 
concluding that the suspect cannot be ex-
cluded as a possible contributor of the un-
known print. However, a significant short-
coming of this conclusion is that it does not 
specify the size of the nonexcluded class of 
individuals.
The second conclusion reflects the lan-
guage that has been recommended by the 
U.S. Army.19 It is essentially a statement 
that the false positive error rate is “extreme-
ly low.” Because this conclusion does not 
specify what is meant by “extremely low,” 
it is hard for anyone to know how much 
weight to assign to this evidence.
The third conclusion may be defensible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but as 
a purely scientific matter, it is also less de-
fensible than the first conclusion because 
the examiner is making an inferential leap 
from evidence indicating that a suspect 
may be the source of a print to a personal 
conclusion that the suspect is, in fact, the 
source of that print.20 Even if the available 
science gave the examiner good reason to 
believe that the class of people who might 
be the source of the print is very small, a 
source claim involves a degree of specula-
tion and guesswork that extends beyond 
what the science can show.21
The fourth conclusion suffers from the 
same problem as the third, but is even 
more objectionable because it appends 
the impressive-sounding but scientifical-
ly meaningless phrase “to a reasonable de-
gree of scientific certainty” to the examin-
er’s personal opinion. The result may be 
inflated confidence or simply greater vari-
ability in understanding the level of confi-
dence it is intended to convey.22
The fifth conclusion, which has long been 
favored by the fbi, goes further by replac-
ing the “opinion” language in conclusions 
three and four with “individualization” lan-
guage.23 Use of this language might give the 
misleading impression that the science it-
self has unequivocally identified the source 
of the print.24
The sixth conclusion is even stronger 
than the fifth because it expressly states that 
the individualization has excluded all oth-
er possible sources in the world.
In sum, the first conclusion is the least 
objectionable from the standpoint of sci-
ence and logic, though it is far from satis-
fying. The second conclusion is problem-
atic because it does not explain what an 
“extremely low” chance of a coincidental 
match means. Conclusions three through 
six all involve a questionable scientific 
leap of faith in moving from the absence 
of proof that two prints come from differ-
ent sources to a finding that the two prints 
must have come from a common source.
Returning to the experiment, after the 
fingerprint examiner stated his or her con-
clusion, the prosecutor repeated the exam-
iner’s conclusion verbatim, as many pros-
ecutors do to ensure that jurors don’t miss 
the examiner’s conclusion. The examin-
er confirmed that this was indeed his con-
clusion.






Half of the jurors (Conditions 1–6) read 
a cross-examination that was tailored to 
challenge the specific conclusion used by 
the fingerprint examiner. For example, 
when the fingerprint examiner said that 
he was able to “effect an individualiza-
tion” on that latent print to the defendant, 
Mr. Johnson, “to the exclusion of all other 
possible sources in the world” (Condition 
6), the cross-examiner elicited a confession 
from the witness that he has not actually ex-
amined the prints of all other people in the 
world. Likewise, when the examiner says, 
“in my opinion, the defendant, Mr. John-
son, is the source of that print” (Condition 
3), the cross-examiner elicits a confession 
from the expert witness that he is not claim-
ing that he absolutely positively knows that 
the print came from Mr. Johnson’s finger, to 
the exclusion of all other possible sources in 
the world. The other half of the jurors were 
assigned to a no–cross examination condi-
tion (Conditions 7–12). Table 1 summarizes 
the twelve conditions. Whether or not they 
read a cross-examination, jurors in all con-
ditions answered the same set of questions 
about the case. 
We asked jurors four “source” ques-
tions about the value of the fingerprint ev-
idence for the proposition that the finger-
print belonged to the defendant, Mr. John-
son. Questions 1–3 and 5 used a scale that 
ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely): 
1. How strong would you say the fingerprint 
evidence is with respect to the prosecutor’s 
claim that the fingerprint on the cash register 
tray belongs to Mr. Johnson (the defendant)?
2. How convincing would you say the finger-
print evidence is with respect to the prosecu-
tor’s claim that the fingerprint on the cash 
register tray belongs to Mr. Johnson (the de-
fendant)? 
3. How confident are you that the fingerprint 
on the cash register tray was left by the de-
fendant? 
4. What would you say is the probability that 
the fingerprint on the cash register tray be-
longs to the defendant? (Please provide a 
number between 0% and 100%.)
Next, we asked two “guilt” questions 
about jurors’ beliefs that the defendant, 
Mr. Johnson, committed the robbery: 
5. How confident are you that the finger-
print on the cash register tray was left by 
the defendant during the course of the con-
venience store robbery? 
6. What would you say is the probability 
that the defendant robbed the convenience 
store? (Please provide a number between 
0% and 100%.)
The answers participants provided to 
the four source and two guilt questions 
were all highly correlated with one anoth-
er (0.69 < r’s < 0.88). We therefore creat-
ed an aggregated “strength of evidence” 
index for each participant that gave equal 
weight to the six questions asked.
The next task was to compare the con-
ditions with cross-examination to those 
without. To do so, we combined the in-
dices for participants in Conditions 1 to 
6 into an index with cross-examination. 
Similarly, we combined the indices for par-
ticipants in Conditions 7 to 12 into an in-
dex without cross-examination. The data 
indicated that there was no effect for cross- 
examination. If anything, our subjects found 
the evidence without cross-examination 
slightly more plausible than the evidence 
with cross-examination, but the difference 
is so slight that we can ignore it. This per-
mits us to aggregate Conditions 1 and 7, 2 
and 8, and so on, giving us only six condi-
tions (distinguished by the wording used 
by the fingerprint examiner). When we re-
fer in the rest of this essay to Condition 1, 
for example, what we mean is the aggre-
gation of Conditions 1 and 7 in Table 1; 
the same is true of all Conditions 1–6. 
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Whether another style of cross-examina-
tion would show a larger effect is not ad-
dressed by our data.
Our primary analysis focuses on how dif-
ferences in the language that the fingerprint 
examiner used to describe the match evi-
dence affected subjects’ judgments about the 
strength of the evidence. We do this by com-
paring the evidence strength index scores 
across the six fingerprint examiner condi-
tions. In Figure 1, arrayed along the hori-
zontal axis are the conditions, and the ver-
tical axis is the index of strength of evidence. 
Figure 1 shows that the language used by the 
fingerprint examiner in Condition 1 (“can-
not exclude”) was the least impactful way of 
reporting the fingerprint evidence, followed 
by Condition 2 (“the likelihood of observing 
this amount of correspondence . . . is consid-
ered extremely low”). The language used to 
describe fingerprint evidence in Conditions 
3–6 was more impactful than that of Con-
ditions 1 and 2, and differed little by condi-
tion. To the extent our results generalize to 
actual trials, we see the importance of how 
forensic scientists present their testimony, 
and the need to ensure that the language a 
forensic scientist uses fairly reflects the ev-
identiary implications of the reported ev-
idence.
The language used by the fingerprint ex-
aminer in the six conditions was designed 
to vary in the certitude with which the ex-
aminer provided his conclusion. For exam-
ple, an examiner who says that he has “ef-
fected an individualization on that print to 
Mr. Johnson to the exclusion of all possible 
other sources in the world” (Condition 6) 
appears to be expressing much greater cer-
tainty in his conclusion than an examiner 
who simply says that Mr. Johnson cannot 
be excluded as a possible contributor of the 
Table 1 
Twelve Conditions
                 
Expert Testimony Cross-Examination No Cross-Examination
Cannot exclude Mr.  
Johnson
1  7
The likelihood of observing 
this amount of correspon-
dence when two impressions 
are made by different sources 
is considered extremely low
2  8
Mr. Johnson is the source 3  9
Mr. Johnson is the source to a 
reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty
4 10
I effected an individualization 
on that print to Mr. Johnson
5 11
I effected an individualization 
on that print to Mr. Johnson 
to the exclusion of all possible 
other sources in the world
6 12
Condition






same print (Condition 1). We checked this 
assumption by asking jurors the following 
question: “How certain was the expert that 
the defendant was the source of the finger-
print on the cash register tray?” The dis-
tribution of jurors’ answers across the six 
conditions is plotted in Figure 2. Here the 
vertical axis is a scale of certainty (1 = low, 
7 = high). As expected, the data show that 
people believe that the fingerprint examin-
er is least certain in Condition 1, followed 
by Condition 2. Further, our jurors believed 
that the examiner was more certain of his 
conclusion in Conditions 3–6 than in Con-
ditions 1 and 2. It is notable that the medians 
for Conditions 3–6 are identical. 
We also asked our participants wheth-
er the uncertainty expressed by the finger-
print examiner mattered: “How much does 
it matter in a case like this whether the ex-
Figure 1 
Perceived Strength of Evidence by Condition
Note: Condition 1 = cannot exclude; Condition 2 = extremely low likelihood of such correspondence by differ-
ent sources; Condition 3 = source of the print; Condition 4 = source of the print to a reasonable degree of scien-
tific certainty; Condition 5 = individualization; Condition 6 = individualization to the exclusion of all other pos-
sible sources in the world. The rectangular boxes above each condition capture the interquartile range, and the 
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pert witness is certain about his conclu-
sions (rather than expressing uncertain-
ty)?” The degree of certainty expressed by 
the fingerprint examiner mattered a great 
deal to our jurors in all conditions (medi-
an ratings of 6 or 7 out of 7). 
In addition to seeking judgments about 
the weight the fingerprint evidence de-
served, we sought demographic and opin-
ion information from our respondents. We 
found that men, African Americans, and 
those with graduate degrees are some-
what more skeptical of fingerprint evi-
dence than others. Jury service and law 
enforcement service (self or relative), po-
litical leanings (liberal or conservative), 
and frequency of watching csi or similar 
television shows had no effect on indexed 
responses. However, we did find a strong 
relationship between index scores and re-
sponses to the item below:
Our criminal justice system should be less 
concerned about protecting the rights of the 
people charged with crimes and more con-






























Figure 3 shows that respondents who 
thought we should be more concerned 
about convicting the guilty (as reflected 
by agreement or strong agreement with 
the statement above) tended to assign 
more weight to the fingerprint evidence 
across conditions. It is not surprising that 
this should be so. Perhaps it is further ev-
idence that “we see things not as they are, 
but as we are.” 
To summarize, participants in our study 
attached more weight to the fingerprint 
evidence in the four conditions (3–6) in 
which the examiner indicated in some 
manner that he or she believes or knows 
that the defendant is the source of the print 
than when the examiner offered a weak-
er, but more scientifically justifiable, con-
clusion (Conditions 1 and 2). The phras-
es commonly used to bolster source opin-
ion and individualization claims (“to a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” 
and “to the exclusion of all other people in 
the world,” respectively) had no apprecia-
Figure 3 
Perceived Strength of Evidence by Conviction Proneness
Note: Participants who marked Strongly Agree or Agree to the conviction proneness question indicated a rela-
tively strong concern for convicting the guilty, and participants who marked Disagree or Strongly Disagree indi-
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ble effect on the judgments of our jurors. 
A simple cross-examination that was tai-
lored to highlight weaknesses in the fin-
gerprint evidence in each condition like-
wise had no impact regardless of which 
type of conclusion the examiner offered. 
Gender, race/ethnicity, education, politi-
cal leaning, jury service, and law enforce-
ment service (their own or that of a rela-
tive) produced only minor effects, though 
we did find that people who indicated that 
our criminal justice system should be more 
concerned with convicting the guilty tend-
ed to assign greater weight to the finger-
print evidence.
Fingerprint analysts may find that a la-
tent print and a known print share cer-
tain characteristics. However, at the pres-
ent time, they have no scientific way to 
estimate the number of people in a given 
population whose fingerprints are like-
ly to share those characteristics.25 In this 
respect, fingerprint analysis differs from 
dna analysis because only the latter has 
systematically documented the frequen-
cy of the relevant characteristics among 
various populations. Consequently, there 
is insufficient scientific justification for a 
claim that the person whose fingerprint 
matches that of a latent print recovered 
from a crime scene must be the source of 
that print. For this reason, we believe the 
source and individualization statements 
in some of our conditions overstate the 
strength of the evidence.
On June 3, 2016, the Department of Jus-
tice proposed “uniform language for tes-
timony and reports for the forensic latent 
print discipline.”26 This proposal includ-
ed approval for a finding of identification, 
but barred “to the absolute exclusion of all 
others” and “a zero error rate or . . . infalli-
ble.” Our results show that the proposed 
limitations are unlikely to affect how lay 
persons, such as judges and jurors, under-
stand latent print testimony. However, we 
did find that when the identification lan-
guage is abandoned in favor of the weaker, 
but more scientifically justifiable, “cannot 
be excluded” conclusion, people attached 
less weight to the fingerprint evidence. If 
future researchers are able to identify the 
frequency with which various print fea-
tures arise in the population, then per-
haps the cannot-be-excluded conclusion 
could be modified to include an estimate 
of the number of people who could be the 
source of the latent print in question. If 
that group is sufficiently small, it seems 
likely that people will attach more weight 
to fingerprint evidence that is presented 
with the further empirically justified in-
formation attached. 
The President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology (pcast) report-
ed in 2016 that 
Based largely on two recent appropriately de-
signed black-box studies, pcast finds that 
latent fingerprint analysis is a foundation-
ally valid subjective methodology–albeit 
with a false positive rate that is substantial 
and is likely to be higher than expected by 
many jurors based on longstanding claims 
about the infallibility of fingerprint analy-
sis. Conclusions of a proposed identifica-
tion may be scientifically valid, provided that 
they are accompanied by accurate informa-
tion about limitations on the reliability of 
the conclusion–specifically, that (1) only 
two properly designed studies of the foun-
dational validity and accuracy of latent fin-
gerprint analysis have been conducted, (2) 
these studies found false positive rates that 
could be as high as 1 error in 306 cases in one 
study and 1 error in 18 cases in the other, and 
(3) because the examiners were aware they 
were being tested, the actual false positive 
rate in casework may be higher.27
The two studies referred to in the pcast 
report come from Noblis researcher Brad-
ford T. Ulery and colleagues in 2011 and 
2012.28 We are less impressed with these 






studies than was pcast for several reasons. 
First, the subjects were volunteers who 
knew they were being tested. Second, the 
studies were paid for by the fbi (an interest-
ed party) and some of the authors worked 
for the fbi. Third, the proportion of judg-
ments of identification and exclusion var-
ied widely, suggesting that some examin-
ers were very cautious, perhaps more cau-
tious than they would be in casework. This 
reduces the credibility of the false positive 
and false negative rates found in these stud-
ies. Nonetheless, such studies are useful for 
comparing groups of fingerprint examiners 
and for comparing the difficulty of differ-
ent types of fingerprint assessment tasks.
Although our empirical study–which ob-
viously was not designed to measure what 
the Ulery studies measured–does not share 
these shortcomings, our results should like-
wise be interpreted with caution. It is a sin-
gle study, conducted online with individu-
al participants who had no opportunity to 
test their reactions by comparing them with 
those of others, and the precise wording of 
our stimuli and questions may have influ-
enced the answers provided.29 Further, be-
cause we used just one scenario and a single 
forensic technique (fingerprinting), it is dif-
ficult to say how well our results generalize 
either to other fingerprint scenarios or oth-
er forensic science methods.
Having said that, our results appear to re-
inforce and extend the observation by Mc-
Quiston-Surrett and Saks, and Garrett and 
Mitchell that lay people may not be sensi-
tive to distinctions between stronger and 
weaker conclusions that an expert draws 
about forensic matching evidence once 
the expert has declared a match or words 
to that effect.30 In those studies, the judg-
ment made by mock jurors did not vary as a 
function of whether the forensic expert pro-
vided an opinion about whether matching 
hairs came from the same person (McQuis-
ton-Surrett and Saks) or whether matching 
prints were described as not possibly be-
longing to anyone other than the defendant 
(Garrett and Mitchell). Likewise, our mock 
jurors did not draw distinctions among dif-
ferent “source” claims, including those that 
were designed to impress upon jurors that 
no one other than the defendant could be 
the source of the print. That is, once the ex-
aminer in our study offered his opinion that 
the defendant was the source of the print, 
it made no difference to our jurors wheth-
er that source claim was stated as a source 
opinion, a source opinion bolstered by a ref-
erence to “a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty,” or some form of “individualiza-
tion” conclusion. Presumably, then, people 
process these descriptions heuristically, and 
reason that the expert is simply telling them: 
“It’s the defendant’s fingerprint: period.” 
However, when the expert in our study of-
fered a weaker, and more scientifically jus-
tifiable conclusion–one that left open the 
possibility that there are others besides the 
defendant who may be the source (see Con-
ditions 1 and 2)–our jurors assigned less 
weight to the fingerprint evidence.
If the pattern of results we observed 
holds true across domains, then reform ef-
forts that focus not on barring source con-
clusions or statements of identification but 
solely on eliminating the purely bolstering 
features of forensic match reports–features 
such as “to a reasonable degree of scientific 
certainty” or “to the exclusion of all other 
possible sources in the world”–may be in-
effective. Although these claims may be un-
scientific and unhelpful, banning such lan-
guage from the courtroom may have little 
practical effect on how jurors think about 
and use the forensic evidence they hear. 
If courts will not allow source attribution 
statements unless and until scientists can 
offer compelling scientific data that sup-
port such statements, then source attribu-
tion statements in any form should be pro-
hibited at trial. In contrast, moving forensic 
experts toward more conservative, scientif-
ically defensible claims such as “the defen-
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dant cannot be excluded as a possible con-
tributor of the print,” could represent an 
important change.31
Jurors in our study also assigned relative-
ly less weight to fingerprint evidence when 
the Army’s language was used (“the like-
lihood that we would observe this degree 
of correspondence when two impressions 
are made by different sources is considered 
extremely low”).32 Here, as well, the per-
ception of lower probative value proba-
bly reflects an understanding that the ex-
aminer’s statement does not preclude the 
reasonable possibility that people other 
than the defendant might have prints that 
matched the latents in the case.
The fact that cross-examination on the 
shortcomings of the forensic conclusion 
had no impact on our jurors is dishearten-
ing. But this result is not entirely surpris-
ing. Koehler’s results from a 2011 shoeprint 
study are similar.33 He found that defense 
attorney cross-examination of a shoeprint 
expert had no effect on his mock jurors, 
even when that cross-examination re-
vealed important risks that were ignored 
by the match statistic provided.34 But it is 
important to remember that our cross-ex-
amination was only cursory and in print. It 
is possible that a well-tailored live cross-ex-
amination would be more effective. 
Meaningful reform related to the way 
fingerprint evidence is reported should 
bring with it an acknowledgment that the 
available science does not enable examin-
ers to prove that only one person could be 
the source of an unknown print. Source 
conclusions, including those that imply 
a kind of objective certitude (such as “in-
dividualization”) are little more than the 
subjective, untested opinions of examin-
ers. In the words of the respected forensic 
scientist David Stoney, such conclusions 
represent “a leap of faith . . . a jump, an ex-
trapolation, based on the observation of 
highly variable traits.”35
Squaring scientific accuracy with public 
understanding of the value of forensic sci-
ence evidence will require a greater focus 
on empirical research, both to explore fur-
ther the scientific basis of fingerprint anal-
ysis and to identify ways to convey accu-
rately what the science has to offer and its 
associated uncertainties. We see no place 
in this endeavor for individualizations and 
untested source opinions.
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